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RATIONALITY OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
IN BIMATRIX GAMES 
MILAN MARES 
A few brief comments on the sense of the exchange of strategic information in two-players 
games are proposed. It is shown that the rationality of such exchange can be investigated by means 
of the general coalition game model that also offers theoretical tools for the considerations on the 
optimal amount of the exchanged information. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The exchange of at least partial information in a non-antagonistic conflict repre-
sets a primitive form of cooperation in games. It is obvious that in some games the 
information exchange is rational in order to prevent the players from choosing some 
bilaterally unadvantageous strategies. It concerns namely the non-antagonistic games 
and the choosing of some minimax strategies in situations where it has no advantage 
for any player except to guarantee certain level of profit against any theoretically 
possible threat. 
In this paper which generalizes and completes some ideas from [5] we shall briefly 
mention three different ways of the manipulation with the strategic information. 
Namely, the search for information by one player, the offering of information also 
by one player, and the mutual exchange of information. We shall be interested in 
some conditions under which the manipulation with information is useful, in the 
rational price that could be paid for it, and in its rational extent. Some of the con-
clusions are intuitively expectable but it is useful to formulate them in an exact way. 
The mutual exchange of information that represents a virtual bilateral cooperation 
between players can be modelled by means of the general coalition games theory [3], 
as it is shown in this paper, too. These tools enable us to derive in a simple way 
some results concerning the rational forms of the information exchange. Moreover, 
it is possible, then, to use some general results concerning the existence of rational 
solutions of general coalition games [3], [4], [6] and their basic properties. 
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1. BIMATRIX GAME 
The concept of the bimatrix game is well known from the literature (e.g. [ l ] , [2], 
[7]), and we shall remember it here briefly, to introduce the notations used below. 
Let us consider a two-player set / = {1, 2}. The players dispose with the sets of 
pure strategies 
At^{a[
1\...,a[-)}, A2 = {a2
1),...,a2»
)}, 
m > 0 , n > 0 , 
and with the corresponding sets of mixed strategies S;, i = 1,2, where each mixed 
strategy s; e S; is a probability distribution over Ah i = 1, 2. Each mixed strategy is 
consequently an m-dimensional, resp. n-dimensional, real valued vector. It means 
that any set S; c: S;, /' = 1,2 of mixed strategies is a subset of an Euclidian space, 
and it is possible to consider its topological properties, especially its closedness ac-
cording to the usual topology. 
The pay-offs m<-'\al,a2), ateAi, i = 1,2, connected with the pure strategies 
form m x n matrices 
W f - K V i .....».*-i....,., ' = 1.2, 
where 
m^> = m(i\a[j), af), j = 1, ..., m , k = 1, ..., n , i = 1, 2 . 
Then the pay-offs connected with mixed strategies are given by the formula 
(1.1) ™<o(Si> S a ) = £ £ Si{aW). S2(a(*>). mco , i - 1,2, 
j = 1 k = 1 
where s^a^1) and s2(a2
k)) are the probabilities of a[j) and a(k) under the probability-
distributions st and s2, respectively. 
The quintuple F = (I, Slt S2, Mlt M2) shall be called a bimatrix game. 
A bimatrix game F is antagonistic iff for all st. s[ e Si, s2, s'2 e S2 
m ( 1 ,(s i , s2) ^ «
( 1 ) (s i , si) <* «i (2 )(s1; s2) ^ m
(2)(s2, s[). 
In more special case, every game F such that M1 = — »VI2 is antagonistic. 
In the following parts of this paper we shall be interested in the mixed strategies 
only, as each pure strategy can be considered as a special degenerated mixed strategy. 
We say that the mixed strategies s* e S1 and s* e S2 are the guarantee strategies 
(cf. [8]) iff 
(1.2) min »i(1)(s*, s2) ^ min m
(1\Sl, s2) for all Sl e S1 , 
s2eS2 s 2 e S 2 
and 
(1.3) min m(2\Sl, s*) ^ min m^s^ s2) for all s2 e S2 . 
SIESI sieSi 
The numbers 
(1.4) vi(r) = max min m(1\Sl, s2) = min m
{l\s*, s2) 
S|ESl S26S2 S26S2 
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and 
(1.5) r2(r) = m a x m m m<2\si, s2) — mm n , (2>(s1, s2) 
s2eS2 sieSi SIESI 
shall be called the values of the game T for player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
It is not difficult to prove that the values exist not only for the game T with the 
sets of mixed strategies Sj and S2 but also whenever some their non-empty and closed 
subsets Sj c: Sj and S2 cz S2 are considered. 
The guarantee strategies play an important role. Using them the player may be 
sure that his pay-off cannot be worse than the corresponding value of the game, and 
that no other strategy can guarantee a better pay-off for him. 
It was proved in the classical literature, e.g. in [2], [7] and [9], that in every 
antagonistic bimatrix game there exists a pair of guarantee strategies s* e Sl5 s* e S2 
such that 
B l ( r ) = m
( 1 )(s*,5*), v2(r) = m^(st,s*2) 
and that for sx e S., s2 e S2 
m a )(si , s2) ^ v,(r) o m
(2)(Sl, s2) = v2(r). 
2. INFORMATION IN BIMATRIX GAME 
The guarantee strategies have a good sense especially in case of antagonistic games. 
However, in the non-antagonistic case their advantages are not so clear. In fact, they 
guarantee certain pay-off against the worst possible behaviour of the anti-player but 
there often hardly exists a reason to expect such behaviour. If one player gets reliable 
information that his partner eliminated some of his strategies, he can change also his 
own strategy choice and to guarantee more acceptable outcome. 
In the following sections of this paper we shall be interested in three types of such 
manipulation with the strategical information. First, we shall briefly mention the 
case when one player gets an opportunity to obtain some information about the 
strategy of his partner. Further we shall study the possibility of offering some infor-
mation about player's own strategy to the partner in order to influence his behaviour. 
Finally, we shall investigate the most interesting case of the mutual exchange of 
information between both the players. 
In all cases we shall represent an information about the strategies of player i = 1, 2 
by a non-empty and closed subset S; c S; containing the strategies that might be 
used by player i. Why was exactly this model chosen? 
It is the least exaggerating one concerning the form of the knowledge on the 
strategies. It is limited to the only information which strategies come into account 
and which do not. Within these limits the model suggested here offers a wide scale 
of possibilities, including the concentration of probabilities to some pure strategies 
or to only some probabilistic mixtures of strategies up to the concrete conditions of 
the modelled situation. 
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Generally, it would be possible to model the information about the chosen strategies 
by a probability distribution Pt over S;, i = 1, 2. This attitude assumes much more 
knowledge on the probabilistic character about the stiategy choice, that is not 
always available. Moreover, the probability distribution Pt over S; leads very easily 
to a probability distribution q{ over A;, i = I, 2, where qt is a probabilistic mixture 
of P ; and the probabilities s; e S; 
(2.1) q/Ai))= [ s;(a^) dP;(s;), 
Js, 
j = 1, ..., m for i = 1 , j — 1, . , . , n for i = 2 , 
if the well known measure theoretic assumptions are fulfilled. For us it means that q( 
is a mixed strategy, qt e S;, and that we have reduced the set S; to one signle point. 
This point can represent our vague knowledge about the strategy choice but it may 
be essentially different from the strategy really chosen by player i. It could be a good 
topic for discussion which information is more preferable, the substitution of S ; 
by a subset S; c S; certainly containing the really chosen strategy, or the reduction 
of S; to one strategy q; that reflects our knowledge on the actually chosen strategy 
but may be different from it. In this paper the first one of both the possibilities is 
preferred. 
3. INFORMATION OBTAINING 
In this section we shall be interested in the simpliest one of the problems mentioned 
in the previous section. We shall try to define the value of the information about the 
strategy of one player for his partner. Let us suppose that player 1 is the player that 
obtains the information. 
It means that there exists a set S, 0 4= S2 c S2, containing all the mixed strategies 
really applicable by player 2. We suppose that S2 is closed. Then the game F is 
transformed into 
F = (I, Su S2, Mu M2) 
with the values »i(F) and v2(F) for both the players. If player 2 keeps his guarantee 
attitude and chooses one of his guarantee strategies then i>2(E) = »2(r). Even in this 
case may be i>i(f) 4= v^F). 
Statement 1. For every information S2 about the strategy of players 2 the inequality 
*.(f) = p.(r) holds. 
Proof. The statement obviously follows from(1.4) applied to the games F and f, 
and from the fact that S2 <= S2. • 
The information S2 is effective for player 1 iff vL(r) — vx(F) > 0, and it is rational 
to pay for it a price not greater than v^f) - v^r). 
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Statement 2. If the game f is antagonistic and if the player 2 plays his guarantee 
strategy then no information S2 <= S2 can be effective for player 1. 
Proof. If »1(f) > vt(r) then there exists sx e St such that 
min m(1)(s1, s2) > v^F) = max min m
(1)(su s2). 
s2<sS2 sieSi s2eS2 
But it means that 
(3.1) max min//.<2,(s,, s2) < v2'F) , 
s2eS2 .v,eS( 
according to the definition of the antagonistic game. It is a contradiction to the 
assumption that S2 contains at least one guarantee strategy, and that there should 
be equality in (3.1). • 
4. INFORMATION OFFERING 
The second subject connected with the utilization of the information in bimatrix 
games is rather more complicated. One of the both players, we suppose that it is 
player 1, may offer an information about his strategy choice to his partner. In the 
following explanation we suppose that the information can be reliably checked and 
that it is always true, consequently. 
Player 1 offers the information when he supposes that his partner uses a guarantee 
strategy and it is useful to turn this guarantee attitude towards another, for player 1 
more acceptable, strategy. 
Let us denote by Sx the information about the strategy choice of player 1, 0 #= 
4= Sx c Su 5 is closed. Let us denote by S2 <= S2 the set of all guarantee strategies 
of player 2 in the game f = (/, Su S2, Mu M2). Then S2 is obviously also closed 
and we can consider another game 
T* = (I, Su S2, Mu M2) 
with the values v^F*) and v2(r*) for both players. Let us remember that v^r) and 
v2(r) are the values of the original game T. Then we can formulate the following 
statement. 
Statement 3. If the information offering procedure is realized in the way described 
above then v2(T*) ;> v2(F). 
Proof. It follows from (1.5) and from the fact that S2 contains exactly all gurantee 
strategies of player 2 that v2(F*) = v2(P) is the value of both games, f and T*, 
for player 2. If Sx c Sl then (1.5) implies that the value v2(F) of f for player 2 
cannot be less than the value v2T) of F. • 
Statement 4. There exists at least one information offering Sj c: St such that 
».(r*) ^ VI(F). 
Proof. It is sufficient to choose Sx = S1 which is a trivial case, or St = {s1 e S.: sx 
is a guarantee strategy}. • 
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The information offering SL is effective for player 1 iff vL(r*) > vL(r) and the 
difference vL(r*) - vL{F) limits the reasonable price that player 1 can pay for the 
possibility to offer the information SL. 
Statement 5. If the game F is antagonistic then there is no information offering 
that would be eflective. 
Proof. It follows from Statement 3 that there exists a strategy s2 e S2 such that 
m(2)(sL,s2) = v2(r) for all sLeSL. It means, according to the definition of the 
antagonistic property, that 
mw(sL, s2) £ vt(r) for all sLeSL 
and then also vL(r*) ^ vL(r). • 
5. MUTUAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
In the remaining sections we shall deal with the case of the mutual exchange of 
information between both players. Such information exchange, in fact a bilateral 
information offering, should satisfy both players. It means that it should be con-
nected with an increase of pay-offs of both of them and respect their preferences. 
In this sense it represents a very elementary form of cooperation. 
It is obvious that the information exchange can be described by a pair of closed 
sets (Sj, S2), where 0 + SL <= SL, 0 + S2 c S2, containing the strategies of both 
players that come into account to be applied in the game. The original game T with 
values vL(r), v2(F) is reduced to another game 
f = (/, S1; S2, ML, M2) 
with the values vL(F) and v2(F) for player 1 and 2, respectively. 
We say that the information exchange (SL, S2) is effective iff there is no other 
information exchange (Sf, S2) such that for the values vL(r*), v2(F*) of the game 
r* = (/, S*, S*, ML, M2) the following relations hold 
Vi(r*) > i>,(f) for both i = 1, 2 , 
t>;(r*) > t);(f) for at least one i e {1, 2} . 
The effectivity concept, namely the differences 0.(T) — vt(F), i = 1, 2, indicate 
the rational price that could be paid by players for the possibility to exchange the 
information. 
The simple form of the cooperation hidden in the information exchange leads to 
the idea to apply some methods of the coalition games theory. We shall do so and 
use the general coalition games concept to investigate the situation described above. 
330 
6. GENERAL COALITION GAME 
The notion of the general coalition game was suggested in [3] in order to find 
a common model for a wide scale of different more special cooperative situations. 
A general coalition game is a pair (/, V) where / is a finite and non-empty set of 
players and V a mapping prescribing to every set of players K <= I a subset V(K) 
of R' (where R is the set of all real numbers) such that 
(6.1) V(K) is closed, 
(6.2) if x e V(K), yeR', x, k y, for all ieK, then y e V(K), 
(6.3) V(K) 4= 0 , 
(6.4) V(K) = R1 oK - 0 . 
The sets K c 1 are called coalitions, any partition Jf" of/ into non-empty coalitions 
is a coalition structure, and every vector x e H7 is called an imputation. 
If x, yeR' then we say that x dominates y via K and write x dom^ y iff x_ ^ y{ 
for all /' e K and x ; > y_ for some i e K. For every K <= / we define 
(6.5) V*(X) = {y e R1: there is no x e V(K) such that x dom^ y} . 
An imputation x e R' is said to be strongly stable iff there exists a coalition 
structure Jf such that x e V(K) for all K e Jf, and, moreover, x e V*(L) for all 
L c J . 
The general coalition game (/, V) is superadditive iff for any pair of disjoint coali-
tions K, L a I, K n L = 0, the inclusion 
(6.6) V(K) n V(L) c V(K u L) 
holds, and it is called additive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions K, L <= I,K n L = 
= 0, inclusions (6.6) and 
(6.7) V*(K) n V*(L) c V*(K u L) 
hold. 
7. MODEL OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
In this section we shall use the apparatus of the general coalition games model to 
derive some properties of the rational information exchange in bimatrix games. Let 
us consider a bimatrix game 
r = (/, Su S2) Mu M2) , / = {1 ,2} , 
and let us denote 
1) v({i}) = {x e R2: x ; S v/f)}, i = 1, 2 , 
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(7.2) V(I) = {xeR2: there exist closed sets St,S2 such that 0 4= St c S,, 
0 =t= S2 c S2 and bimatrix game F = (/, Sx, S2, Mu M2) such 
that Xj g vt(F) and x2 S V2(F)} , 
(7.3) V(0) = « 2 . 
Statement S. The pair (/, V) where J = {l, 2} and the sets V{K) for K c /. are 
defined by (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3) forms a general coalition game. 
Proof. It can be easily verified that the sets V(K) are closed and fulfil condition 
(6.2). The existence of the values »,(f) and v/f), i = 1, 2, implies the validity of (6.3) 
and the finiteness of the values i»,(T) together with (7.3) implies the validity of (6.4). 
Statement 6. The general coalition game (/, V) is superadditive. 
Proof. It is possible to put also S t = Sx and S2 = S2 in (7.2). Consequently, for 
all yeM2 such that yx ^ v^f), y2 S v2(r), also y e V(l). • 
Statement 7. If the original bimatrix game T = (/, Su S2, Mu M2) is antagonistic 
then the general coalition game (/, V) is additive. 
Proof. As inclusion (6.6) follows from Statement 6, it is sufficient to prove the 
validity of (6.7). In case of 2-person game it means to prove the inclusion 
V*({l})nV*({2})<=V*(l). 
Let us consider x = (x t , x2) e V*({l}) n V*({2}). It means that x2 ^ v}(r), x2 ^ 
^ v2(r). If x 4 V*(I) then there exists y e V(I) such that y dotri/ x, i.e. there exist 
Sx c Sj, S2 c S2, closed, non-empty, and F = (/, Sl5 S2, Mlt M2) such that 
(».(f), v2(F)) domAv^r), <r) ) . 
Then, according to the theorems on antagonistic bimatrix games known from the 
literature (cf. [2], [7], [8]), there exist mixed strategies s[, st e Sx <= S[ and s2, s2 e 
e S2 <= S2 such that 
l>1(f) = m<
1>(s1 ,s2)^ . .1(r).= »i<
1'(s'1>s2), 
v2(F)=m^(sl,s2)^v2fr) = m^(s'uS'2), 
and the inequality is strict in at least one of both cases. It contradicts to the assumption 
of the antagonicity of the game E. • 
Statement 8. There always exist strongly stable imputations in the general coalition 
game (/, V). 
Proof. As the elements of the matrices M1, M2 are limited, the set 
W(I) = V(I) n { x e B 2 : x ^ vx(r), x2 ^ v2(r)} 
is bounded and closed. It means that for every x e W(I) — V*(I) there exists y e 
e W(I) n V*(I) such that v domr x. Such y belongs to the sets V(l) n V*(I) and 
F*({1}) n V*({2}) and, consequently, it is strongly stable. • 
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Statement 9. An information exchange (SUS2), where St,S2 are closed sets, 
0 =(= S! c S1( 0 Jp S2 a S2, is effective if and only if the values vt(F), v2(F) of the 
bimatrix game f = (J, S1; S2, M1 ; M2) form a strongly stable imputation in the 
general coalition game (/, V). 
Proof. If the information exchange (S. , S2) is effective then the pair (i>i(f), v2 f ) ) 
is strongly stable in (/, V) as follows from (7.2) and from the definitions of the strcng 
stability and of the effectivity. On the other hand, according to (7.2) and to the defini-
tion of the strong stability, to every strongly stable imputation x = (xt, x2) in (I, V) 
there necessarilly exists an information exchange (S*, S*) and a bimatrix game 
r * = (/, S*, S*, Mx, M2) 
such that X; = v/T*), i = 1, 2. Moreover, the strong stability and (7.2) imply that 
there is no other information exchange S\ a Su S2 cz S2 and no corresponding 
bimatrix game Tf such that 
(».(rt), v2{r*)) dom, (Vi(r% -a(r*)), 
and, consequently, (S*, S2) is effective. • 
Statement 10. There always exists at least one effective information exchange in 
any bimatrix game. 
Proof. The statement follows from Statement 8 and Statement 9 immediately. 
• 
Statement 11. If the considered bimatrix game is antagonistic then the trivial 
information exchange (Sv S2) is effective. 
Proof. The statement follows from Statement 10 and Statement 7. It is connected 
with the properties of additive games presented in [4]. Q 
8. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
Three forms of the manipulation with the strategic information in bimatrix games 
were presented above. The basic idea about the character of the information as a sub-
set of the set of mixed strategies is sufficiently free to include more of special cases. 
For example, the theory may be applied also to the information concerning the pure 
strategy only. 
If the theory is applied to the mixed strategies then it is useful to check in any 
specific case the conditions under which the information on mixed strategies, i.e. on 
probability distributions, has its practical sense. It means under which conditions it 
is reasonable to consider the probabilities and to use probabilistic methods. 
In some situations the concept of the effectivity might seem to be rather weak. 
Then it is possible to substitute it by its stronger modification, where an information 
exchange (S l 5 S2) is strongly effective iff 
--.(f) > v/r) and v2(F) > v2(r) 
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(preserving the notations used in Sections 5 and 7). Such strong effectivity concept 
is equivalent to so called strong domination between imputation in the general 
coalition game (/, V). It is possible to use analogous methods of investigation, and 
also the results would be lather analogous. The essential difference consists in the 
fact that the existence of the strongly effective information exchange is not generally 
guaranteed, and e.g. in antagonistic bimatrix games it is excluded. 
(Received October 2, 1984.) 
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